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It is customary for the parties to a divorce to view the event
through eyes more perceptive of the financial aspects than are those
of the about-to-be-married. The circumstances, especially where the
parties are well-to-do, take on a considerable resemblance to a business
transaction and as is usually true of most modem business negotiations,
the impact of the Internal Revenue Code becomes the tax tail wagging
the business dog. Important as the tax considerations are, however,
they should never be permitted to take precedence over the practical
considerations which determine what may be a desirable financial
arrangement for the parties to a divorce or separation, or for the
children of the marriage. Whenever, therefore, this article recom-
mends one method of settlement as opposed to another, it must be
understood that such conditions are in every instance conditioned on
the premise that after factors other than taxation have been taken
into account, the parties are still free to choose among the alternatives
suggested. It should also be said by way of preface that this article
has been written from the point of view of the advisors to the parties
and does not attempt to consider the sociological or fiscal implications
of the existing law with which the advisor must deal. Attention has
therefore been directed to the problem of selecting the course of action,
among those available under the law, which will minimize the tax
effects to the parties, thus leaving more funds available for the pur-
poses of the settlement to be negotiated. In this connection it should
be noted that it has been assumed, because that is usually the case,
that it is the husband who is to provide the funds rather than the
wife, and that his income is taxed in a higher bracket than is hers, so
that it is desirable to devise a plan which will shift the income tax
burden to her where possible, negotiating the dollar amounts on the
premise that it is the wife who will pay the tax in such cases.
In the simplest type of situation, the tax problem is of course not
difficult. Where the only provision made for the support of a divorced
wife is a decree requiring the husband to make periodic payments for
the wife's support for an indefinite period, the payments are income
to the wife under section 22 (k) of the Internal Revenue Code, and
are deductible by the husband under section 23 (n). No gift or estate
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tax problems are involved at all. Payments decreed by the court to be
made for the support of children, on the other hand, are not deductible
by the father and are correspondingly not taxed as income either to the
child or, if paid to her for the children's benefit, to the wife.
Where larger amounts are at stake, however, counsel for the
parties do not usually submit the matter to the decision of the trial
court; all arrangements are customarily made by a settlement agree-
ment, which may or may not be incorporated in the decree which the
court actually renders. The use of an agreement naturally permits
much greater flexibility, since the parties are not limited by the statu-
tory jurisdiction of the court, and have at their disposal a wide variety
of possible combinations of alimony provisions, lump-sum payments,
installment payments, sliding-scale provisions, trust, insurance and
security arrangements, which may be tailored to suit the needs-and the
tax brackets-of the parties. The lawyer who makes use of these de-
vices must, however, watch their tax implications closely for it is
agreements of this kind that have given rise to tax litigation-some-
times with unfortunate results. And since the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code with respect to alimony deductions did not
appear in it until the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1942, many
questions of interpretation are yet to be settled and some interpreta-
tions already handed down by the courts cannot be considered as final.
The cautious practitioner therefore bears in mind that the tax advice
which he sows today may be reaped, several years hence, in what may
be less favorable weather for the taxpayer.
While the gift and estate tax must as well be taken into account,
it is the income taxes which present the most obvious problems and a
clear understanding of the basic provisions of the statute are of course
a prerequisite. While, as noted above, sections 22 (k) and 23 (n) both
deal with the subject-one with inclusion of the payments in the wife's
income, the other with deductions from that of the husband-the latter
section is little more than a cross reference to the former; it is section
22 (k) which embodies the provisions whose interpretation concerns
us. In addition, consideration must be given to section 171, which
deals with so-called "alimony trusts." Section 22 (k) provides as follows:
Alimony, Etc., Income. - In the case of a wife who is
divorced or legally separated from her husband under a de-
cree of divorce or of separate maintenance, periodic payments
(whether or not made at regular intervals) received subse-
quent to such decree in discharge of, or attributable to prop-
erty transferred (in trust or otherwise) in discharge of a legal
obligation which, because of the marital or family relation-
ship, is imposed upon or incurred by such husband under
such decree or under a written instrument incident to such
divorce or separation shall be includible in the gross income
of such wife, and such amounts received as are attributable to
property so transferred shall not be includible in the gross
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income of such husband. This subsection shall not apply to
that part of any such periodic payment which the terms of
the decree or written instrument fix, in terms of an amount
of money or a portion of the payment, as a sum which is
payable for the support of minor children of such husband.
In case any such periodic payment is less than the amount
specified in the decree or written instrument, for the purpose
of applying the preceding sentence, such payment, to the
extent of such sum payable for such support, shall be con-
sidered a payment for such support. Installment payments
discharging a part of an obligation the principal sum of which
is, in terms of money or property, specified in the decree or
instrument shall not be considered periodic payments for the
purposes of this subsection; except that an installment pay-
ment shall be considered a periodic payment for the purposes
of this subsection if such principle sum, by the terms of the
decree or instrument, may be or is to be paid within a period
ending more than 10 years from the date of such decree or
instrument, but only to the extent that such installment
payment for the taxable year of the wife (or if more than one
such installment payment for such taxable year is received
during such taxable year, the aggregate of such installment
payments) does not exceed 10 per centum of such principal
sum. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, the portion
of a payment of the principal sum which is allocable to a
period after the taxable year of the wife in which it is received
shall be considered an installment payment for the taxable
year in which it is received. (In cases where such periodic
payments are attributable to property of an estate or property
held in trust, see section 171 (b)).
The somewhat involved language of this provision is confusing
to the uninitiated until it is separated into its component parts. In
order to be deductible, the payments must meet a number of
requirements:
(1) The wife must be divorced or legally separated from
her husband under a decree of divorce or separate mainte-
nance.
It has been ruled by the Bureau' of Internal Revenue that
annulment is not a divorce for purposes of this section.' A California
interlocutory decree is a divorce, however. 2 And the fact that the
validity of a divorce may not be recognized in the state of domicile
is apparently irrelevant, since deduction has been allowed in the case
of Connecticut residents who were divorced in Mexico, even though
a new decreee had later been obtained in Nevada upon advice of
council that the Mexican decree would not be recognized in Connecti-
cut.3
1 Bureau Letter, December 8, 1944, reported at 454 CCH 9602.
2 I. T. 8761, 1945 Cum. Bull. 76.
3 G. C. M. 25250, 1947-2 Cum. Bull. 82.
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(2) The payments must be periodic payments.
The statute does not contain a complete definition of the term
"periodic payments," but it does provide that certain installment pay-
ments are not to be considered as "periodic payments." It may be as-
sumed, however, that a single lump-sum payment is dearly not perio-
dic. What if the decree or agreement provides for payment of a
lump sum in a series of installments? Are the installments "periodic
payments?" Section 22 (k) provides an arbitrary answer: if the princi-
pal sum, by the terms of the decree or instrument, may be or is to be
paid within a period ending more than ten years from the date of the
decree or instrument, the installments are considered periodic pay-
ments; otherwise they are not. It should be noted, however, that
payments which are to be made in a period of ten years or less are
excluded from the definition of periodic payments only if they are
installments on a principal sum specified, in terms of money or prop-
erty, in the decree. It is not necessary, of course, that the principal
sum be identified as such in the decree or instrument. For example,
a provision requiring payment of $100 a month until $9500 has been
paid,4 or payment of $100 per month for 50 months,5 is considered a
provision specifying the principal sum. The same is true even if the
payments are subject to being cut off by a contingency, so that, for
example, a provision requiring payments of $125 per week for two
years or until the wife's remarriage, whichever occurs first, is a pro-
vision specifying a lump sum, even though the entire sum may never
have to be paid.6 On the other hand, where the husband is re-
quired to pay a percentage of his net income for a period of less than
ten years, the payments are not installments of a principal sum, be-
cause no principal sum is specified in the decree.1
(3) The payments must be received by the wife subse-
quent to the decree.
This provision means only what it says, but some taxpayers have
nevertheless misunderstood it. It is not necessary that the agreement
provide only for payments beginning after the decree: if the obliga-
tion to make the payments otherwise qualifies, it may be an obliga-
tion to make payments beginning upon the date of the agreement
and continuing after the decree. What this provision does mean is
4 Steinel v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. 409 (1948).
5 Casey v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 224 (1949); accord: Brandt v. Commissioner,
9 T. C. M. 1151 (1950).
6 Estate of Orsatti v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 188 (1949); accord: Fleming v.
Commissioner, 14 T. C. 1308 (1950); Carmichael v. Commissioner, 14 T. C. 1356
(1950); Read v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. M. 399 (1951).
7 Young v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. 724 (1948) (acq.); Lee v. Commissioner,
10 T. C. 834 (1948) (acq.).
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that only those payments made after the decree are deductible. For
this reason, in cases where it has been agreed that a settlement shall
include both a lump sum and periodic payments, it is sometimes pos-
sible to provide for payment of the lump sum before the decree
(since it is not deductible anyway) in exchange for a postponement
of the commencement of the periodic payments until after the de-
cree when they can be deducted.8
(4) The payments must be in discharge of a legal obli-
gation which because of the marital or family relationship is
imposed on the husband incident to the divorce or separa-
tion.
Payment of a debt to the wife will not become deductible mere-
ly because it is incorporated in an agreement which is incident to a
divorce. 9 Thus the deduction will not extend to attorneys' fees10 nor
to the repurchase from the wife of property previously transferred to
her." It has been held that where a husband made voluntary pay-
ments to his divorced wife, the subsequent amendment of the de-
cree to impose retroactively upon him an obligation to make the pay-
ments already made does not make the payments previously made de-
ductible, since they were voluntary when made.' 2
(5) The obligation must be imposed by the decree or
a written instrument incident to the divorce or separation.
There has been considerable litigation arising out of the phrase
"written instrument incident to such divorce or separation." Neither
section 22 (k) nor the Treasury Regulation issued with respect to
that section's attempts to define the phrase, although the regulation
does provide one example indicating that an ante-nuptial agreement
providing for the wife's support for life is not "incident to" a divorce
later obtained by the parties. In general, it is apparently sufficient for
the purposes of section 22 (k) that the agreement be made in contem-
plation of a divorce which is at least reasonably probable and that
it be intended to discharge an obligation of the husband which would
otherwise be enforced by the decree. 14 Where an agreement is made
8 Such a provision may however affect the liability for gift tax, if the amounts
are large enough. This problem is discussed below at page 39 et seq.
9 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (k)-I.
30 I. T. 3856, 1947-1 Cum. Bull. 25.
11 DuBane, 10 T. C. 992 (1948).
12 Van Vlaanderen v. Commissioner, 175 F. 2d 389 (3rd. Cir. 1949).
13 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (k)-i (1948).
14 Zilmer v. Commissioner, 16 T. C. 365 (1951) (acq.), where the parties had
discussed divorce at the time of the agreement. But cf. Miller v. Commissioner,
16 T. C. 1010 (1951), where the husband knew of the wife's intention to seek a
divorce but there was no definite understanding to that effect. This problem is
avoided if the decree orders compliance with an existing agreement. Neeman v.
Commissioner, 13 T. C. 397 (1949).
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for the purpose of fixing the rights of the parties arising out of di-
vorce litigation which is actually pending or about to be filed, a com-
mon practice is to condition the agreement expressly on the entry of
a decree. Such an agreement is clearly "incident to" the divorce. But
it is not essential that the agreement be specifically conditioned on
the decree, if the circumstances otherwise indicate that divorce was
contemplated and that the parties intended that the agreement satis-
fy the husband's obligation to support his divorced wife.15 And where
this is not practicable, as where the agreement is made at the time of a
voluntary separation, the usual practice is to provide that if a divorce
shall ever be obtained by either of the parties while the agreement is
in effect, the agreement shall be incorporated in the decree. The latter
type of provision may also be used where the local law with respect to
collusion makes the former provision of doubtful propriety. Where
the payments are actually made pursuant to an agreement made after
the decree, or pursuant to a modification, after the decree, of a for-
mer agreement incident to the divorce, a question arises as to whether
the later agreement is itself incident to the divorce. Where the later
agreement was made in consideration of the wife's agreement not to
contest the validity of an existing decree or where the later agree-
ment is merely voluntary' 6 the payments under it have been held not
deductible. Whether such an agreement can be held to be incident
to the divorce may depend on whether the court has retained jurisdic-
tion to modify its decree. Thus where the original decree was amend-
ed to terminate its alimony provisions when the parties had entered
into an agreement embodying provisions in lieu thereof, it was held
that the agreement was incident to the divorce,' 7 but the result is
otherwise where the court has retained no jurisdiction to modify its
decree.' 8 While the point has not been decided, it seems probable
that, if the court has retained jurisdiction, and if the agreement is in
settlement of the wife's contention that the court should increase the
allowance made to her, the agreement is incident to the divorce.
(6) The payments which are deductible may not include
any part which the terms of the decree or instrument fix
as a sum payable for the support of minor children.
15 Neeman v. Commissioner, supra note 14; Brady v. Commissioner, 10 T. C.
1192 (1948) (acq.); Johnson v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. 647 (1948) (acq.).
16 Cox v. Commissioner, 176 F. 2d 226 (3rd. Cir. 1949); Alboum v. Commis-
sioner, 10 T.C. M. 300 (1951); Dauwalter v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 580 (1947) (tax-
payer's appeal to 3rd. Cir. dismissed); Sharp v. Commissioner, 15 T. C. 185 (1950).
17 Smith v. Commissioner, 16 T. C. 639 (1951). Cf. Gale v. Commissioner, 191
F. 2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951), where the court held taxable to the wife as periodic pay.
ments the amount which was paid her pursuant to an amendment of the original
decree retroactively increasing the alimony allowance.
18 Dauwalter v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 580 (1947) (taxpayer's appeal to 3rd.
Cir. dismissed).
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The deduction is of course limited to payments to the wife, and
payments to or for the benefit of the children are not deductible.
However, it is important to note that the deduction is not lost unless
the portion for the support of the children is fixed by the terms of the
instrument either in an amount of money or in terms of a portion
of the payment. Thus if the agreement provides that the husband
shall pay $300 out of which one-third shall be for the support of the
child, or that he shall pay $200 to the wife for her own support and
$100 to her for the support of the child, only $200 of the payment is
deductible.' 9 If instead, the agreement had merely provided for the
payment to the wife of $300 per month for her support and that of
the child, the entire $300 would have been taxable to the wife.2 0 It
might be supposed that with this rule in mind, it would be possible
in every case to draw an instrument, if so desired, which would per-
mit deductions for the support of the entire family. Failures have re-
sulted, however, from the husband's reluctance to permit his obliga-
tion to remain unaffected by the death or majority of the child, or
from the insistence of the wife upon continued support for the chil-
dren after her remarriage. Thus, in the last example given above, if
the agreement had gone on to provide that upon the death or ma-
jority of the child the payment should be reduced to $200, or that
upon the death or remarriage of the mother the husband should
therefore contribute $100 per month to the support of the child, the
courts would deduce that a specific designation of $100 for the child
had been made by the instrument, and the deductibility of that
amount would be sacrificed.2 1
The nearest answer to the problem appears to be in a provision
for payments decreasing in amount after a stated interval. For ex-
ample, suppose that the couple have two children, aged ten and seven.
It might be provided that payments should be made of $300 per
month for the first ten years, $250 per month for the next five years,
and $200 per month thereafter, all payments to terminate upon the
death or remarriage of the wife. It will be noted that there is a re-
duction in the amount of the payment of $50 when the first child
is 20 and another $50 when the other is 22 - a reasonable approxima-
tion of majority. The payments are unaffected by the death of a child,
but the probability of that event is ordinarily not so great as to make
this a serious problem. This arrangement does have the disadvan-
tage that if the wife dies or remarries, there is no provision for the
19 Budd v. Commissioner, 7 T. C. 413 (1946), af'd, 177 F. 2d 198 (6th Cir.
1947); Leslie v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. M. 807 (1948); Swallen v. Commissioner, 10
T. C. M. 475 (1951).
20 Moitoret v. Commissioner, 7 T. C. 640 (1946); Newcombe v. Commissioner,
10 T. C. M. 152 (1951).
21 Mandel v. Commissioner, 185 F. 2d 50 (7th Cir. 1950); Fleming v. Comis-
sioner, 14 T. C. 1808 (1950).
[Vol. 13
TAX IMPLICATIONS
children and she must rely for their support on the husband's con-
tinuing legal obligation to them. In the event of her death, other ar-
rangements would of course have to be made in any event. Whether a
termination of the payments in the event of her remarriage would be
a serious obstacle would probably depend primarily on the facts of
the case, such as the financial condition of the husband and an esti-
mate of his probable attitude toward the children. Subject to these
qualifications, the suggested provision appears to be a legitimate
method of providing a full deduction for family support by scaling
down the payments according to a very roughly predicted schedule of
the declining financial burden of the wife.
It should be noted that special provision is made for cases in
which the husband fails to pay the full amount he is obligated to
contribute to the support of his wife and children. In such cases the
amount actually paid is credited first against the support of the
children, and only the excess is credited against the deductible pay-
ments to the wife.
THE TEN-YEAR REQUIREMENT
The "ten-year" provisions of section 22 (k) are likely to be the
most troublesome when first encountered. To understand these pro-
visions it must first be remembered, as noted above, that payments are
not deductible unless they are periodic payments, that a lump sum is
not a periodic payment, and that installments on a lump sum are
likewise not periodic payments - and hence not deductible - unless
they meet the conditions set by these provisions.
The first condition is that the principal sum "may be, or is to be
paid within a period ending more than ten years from the date of
such decree or instrument." Note that the statute says "more than." If
the last payment is to be made on the tenth anniversary of the date
of the decree or instrument, it comes a day too soon and ten years
of deductions are lost. Perhaps it should be added that the instru-
ment also should not provide for the payment of "100,000 in ten equal
annual installments the first of which shall be paid upon execution of
this agreement." This is of course a nine-year agreement.
One further, and less obvious, pitfall may be encountered in
measuring the period. It will be noted that the statute says "ten years
from the date of such decree or instrument." "Such" undoubtedly re-
fers back to the "decree or instrument" by the terms of which the obli-
gation may be or is to be paid within the specified period. Where the
obligation is imposed only by the decree, the date of the decree gov-
erns; if it is imposed only by the instrument, the date of the instru-
ment governs. But what if both the decree and the instrument im-
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pose the obligation? Or what if the instrument imposes the obliga-
tion, but the obligation becomes effective only if a decree is entered?
Mr. and Mrs. Blum had such an agreement, which was actually enter-
ed into long before the enactment of section 22 (k) but which happen-
ed to provide for installment payments the last of which was to be
made on a date more than ten years from the date of the instrument
and more than ten years from the date the court signed the decree,
but less than ten years from the date of the entry of the decree on the
journal. Several years of litigation resulted for both husband and
wife. The Tax Court held in both cases 22 that since the obligation did
not become effective until the decree was entered, the obligation was
imposed by the decree and the agreement together and the period
ran from the date of the decree, when the obligation finally became
binding. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision in the husband's
case primarily on the ground that under the Illinois law the "date
of the decree" was the date of its signing, but secondarily on the
ground that the ten-year period ran from the date of the instru-
ment.23 In the wife's case, however, the same court elected the second
ground exclusively.24 It may be that the matter is now settled, but it
would seem a wise precaution, in cases where the decree is to follow
so closely upon the execution of the instrument as to make it practi-
cal to do so, to provide in the instrument for a period which will not
expire until more than ten years after the actual journal entry.
From what has appeared so far, it might be supposed that a lump-
sum payment could be converted into a deductible installment sim-
ply by coupling it with smaller installment payments as, for example,
by providing for the payment of $75,000, of which $50,000 is to be
paid one month after entry of the decree, and the balance is to be
paid in annual installments of $2500 per year for ten years thereafter.
This device was anticipated, however, by the authors of section 22 (k).
It is true that the installments need not be equal in amount. But their
inequality may result in a loss of part of the deduction. The section
provides that each installment may be deducted only to the extent
that it does not exceed ten per cent of the principal sum. Thus in
the example given the principal sum is $75,000, the aggregate of all
the payments, and only $7500 may be deducted out of the $50,000
paid in the first year. The later payments are of course allowable in
full.
There is a further limitation which has been introduced by the
courts. The ten per cent limitation applies only where the principal
sum is specified. If the agreement provides that the husband shall
22 Harry Blum v. Commissioner, 7 T. C. M. 798 (1948); Tillie Blum v. Commis-
sioner, 10 T. C. 1131 (1948).
23 177 F. 2d 670 (7th Cir. 1949).
24 187 F. 2d 177 (7th Cir. 1951).
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pay $200 per month until death or remarriage, and in addition shall
pay $5000 forthwith, the ten per cent limitation does not apply. In-
stead it has been held in such cases that the $5000 payment is a lump-
sum payment, separable from the provision for a $200 periodic pay.
ment.25 This principle has already been extended to a somewhat less
obvious situation, where the agreement provided for monthly install-
ments for one year and also for monthly periodic payments during
the joint lives of the parties.26 In these cases, the installment payments
overlap the periodic payments in the initial period. But suppose they
do not: suppose the agreement provides for $200 per month for the
first year and $100 per month thereafter. Will the courts hold (a)
that this agreement calls for a periodic payment of $100 plus install-
ments on a principal sum of $1200, so that $1200 will be disallowed in
the first year, or (b) that it calls for payment of a principal sum of
$2400 in the first year, all of which will be disallowed, and deductible
periodic payments beginning in the second year, or (c) that the case is
merely one of decreasing periodic payments so that no deduction is
lost?
In Fleming v. Commissioner," the agreement in form provided
for $200 per month for five years and $100 per month for the next
sixteen years, with provisions for reductions in the event of the death
or remarriage of the wife or the death of the child. The Tax Court
was able to interpret the agreement as equivalent to one requiring
payment of $100 per month for 21 years or until the death of the
child, and $100 per month for five years or until the death or remar-
riage of the wife, with the result that the 21-year payments were disal-
lowed because they were for the support of the child, and the five-year
payments were disallowed because they were installments on a lump
sum payable in not more than ten years. This case may be cited as
authority in support of position (a) in the preceding paragraph. The
same result would not necessarily have been reached, however, if the
21-year payments had been payments for the support of the wife, or
if instead of the 21-year provision there had been required a payment
for the wife's support for an indefinite period until her death or re-
marriage.
The latter situation was involved in Carmichael v. Commission-
er,28 in which the agreement provided for $200 per month for the
wife and $50 for the child until $27,000 had been paid (a nine-year
period) plus payment of the premiums on an insurance policy on the
life of the husband owned by the wife (a periodic payment). The
25 Norton v. Commissioner, 16 T. C. 1216 (1951); Baer v. Commissioner 16
T. C. 1418 (1951).
26 Haag v. Commissioner, 17 T. C. No. 7 (1951).
27 Fleming v. Commissioner, 14 T. C. 1308 (1950).
28 14 T. C. 1356 (1950).
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agreement was held separable and the $200 payments (and of course
the $50 payments) were disallowed as deductions. 29
The combination which has not been covered by the cases is that
of a principal sum payable in more than ten years with a principal
sum payable in less than ten years, either in a short series of payments
or in a single lump sum. It seems reasonably certain that if an agree-
ment should provide, for example, for the payment of $12,000 on
entry of the decree and $500 per month at monthly intervals thereafter
for 20 years, the courts would consider the payments separable and
deny the deduction of the $12,000. On the other hand, if the agreement
provided for payment of the same aggregate amount ($132,000) in
payments of $700 per month for the first five years and $500 per month
for the next fifteen years, it seems quite possible that the courts might
reach the opposite result. Pending further clarification of the law on
this point, it therefore seems desirable, if the maximum deduction for
the husband is sought, to spread any installments of a lump sum over
as long a period as can be negotiated and combine these payments with
a series of installments extending over more than ten years, as in the
last example. Such an arrangement is at least in a position to
obtain the benefit of favorable authorities when and if such decisions
are made.
In connection with the ten per cent limitation, it should be noted
that special provision is made for payments by the husband in advance.
For example, if it is desired to have the wife receive $100,000 at once
as well as an additional $100,000 over a more than ten-year period, it
will not do to provide for payment of $200,000 over the same period
and let the husband advance $100,000 of the total amount currently.
The statute provides that even though a payment may be properly
allocable to a later year it is to be considered as an installment payment
for the year in which it is received. Thus in the example given, only
$20,000 (ten per cent of the aggregate amount) would be deductible
in the first year.
INSURANCE PREMIU Ms
One further matter which needs to be considered in connection
with section 22 (k) is the handling of insurance premiums, payment of
which may be one form of indirect payment to the wife. It would seem
reasonably clear that if the wife owns a policy, payable to herself,
whether on her own life or that of her husband or a third person, and
if the husband agrees to pay the premiums, the payment is a periodic
,9 The same result was reached in Read v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. Af. 399
(1951) again involving insurance premiums plus cash payments for a less than ten-
year period.
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payment to her and is includible in her income and deductible from
his.30 The problem becomes more difficult as the benefit to the wife
becomes less direct. Where the policies are provided merely as security
for the direct payments, the premiums are not deductible.31 But where
the policies were assigned to the wife, the amounts paid on the premi-
ums by the husband are to be included in the wife's income.32 In one
case where taxability to the wife of other payments was involved, the
Commissioner made no assertion that the payment of premiums by
the husband should be taxable to the wife where the policy, though
not assigned to the wife, named her irrevocably as beneficiary until
she should die or remarry.3 3 But the Bureau appears to be following
administratively a practice of taxing the premiums to the wife where
she is irrevocably named as primary beneficiary (but not where she is
the contingent beneficiary) regardless of whether the policies are
assigned. And deduction of premiums has been allowed to the husband
where the policies were delivered to a trustee pursuant to the agree-
ment.3
4
The case of Boles C. Hart v Commissioner35 produced a surprisingly
favorable result from the husband's point of view. In that case the
decree of divorce required the husband to pay 38.5 per cent of his
income to or for his wife, but provided further that there should be
credited against that amount payments of premiums on insurance held
in an insurance trust for the benefit of the wife and the child. The
distribution provisions of the trust provided for payment of two-thirds
of the income to the wife, the other third going to the settlor's de-
scendants, or if there were none to other persons. The wife had no
interest in principal, which was distributable only after her death.
The Tax Court nevertheless held the payments deductible because
they were charged against obligations imposed for the wife's benefit.
Other factors, such as the fact that the wife could require a reduction
in the amount of the insurance if the cash payments to her fell below
a specified amount, may serve to distinguish the case, and it would
probably be unsafe to construct a separation agreement around it.
It is interesting to note, however, that Mr. Hart did succeed in deduct-
ing the cost of providing an estate which would ultimately pass to his
descendants, an opportunity rarely achieved by the taxpayer.
30 I. T. 4001, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 27.
31 Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 183 F. 2d 15 (3rd. Cir. 1950); Carmichael v.
Commissioner, 14 T. C. 1356 (1950); Gardner v. Commissioner, 14 T. C. 1445
(1950); Taylor v. Commissioner, 16 T. C. 376 (1951).
82 Stewart v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 195 (1947).
33 Hesse v. Commissioner, 7 T. C. 700 (1946).
34 Mandel v. Commissioner, 8 T. C. M. 445 (1949), aff'd as to other issues,
185 F. 2d 50 (7th Cir. 1950).
35 11 T. C. 16 (1948).
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SECrIoN 171
Income taxes in connection with divorce settlements are affected
not only by sections 22 (k) and 23 (n), but also by section 171. The
latter section, however, deals exclusively with the income from trusts.
Like sections 22 (k) and 23 (n), it was added to the Code by the
Revenue Act of 1942.
It will be remembered that, in general, trusts are taxed like in-
dividuals, with certain exceptions, chief of which is that a trust may
deduct, under section 162, income distributed or distributable to the
beneficiary, such income being taxed to the beneficiary. Ordinarily the
income is not taxed to the grantor of the trust, but there are exceptions.
First, under section 166, the income is taxable to the grantor (even
though actually distributed to some one else) where the grantor has
retained the right to revest title to the corpus in himself. Second, under
section 167, the same rule applies where the income may be recovered
by the grantor, or is applied on insurance on his life. Finally, it had
been held, prior to 1942, that the income of a trust established to pay
alimony was taxable to the grantor under section 22 (a), which is the
section of the Code generally defining gross income, on the ground
that the situation was substantially equivalent to one in which the
grantor himself received the income and paid it over to his wife.3 6
Section 171 is designed to shift the burden of the tax on this in-
come from the husband to the wife, just as sections 22 (k) and 23 (n)
shift the burden of the tax on payments made directly by the husband.
It provides as follows:
(a) Inclusion in Gross Income.-There shall be in-
cluded in the gross income of a wife who is divorced or legally
separated under a decree of divorce or of separate main-
tenance the amount of the income of any trust which such
wife is entitled to receive and which, except for the pro-
visions of this section, would be includible in the gross in-
come of her husband, and such amount shall not, despite
section 166, section 167, or any other provision of this chapter,
be includible in the gross income of such husband. This
subsection shall not apply to that part of any such income of
the trust which the terms of the decree or trust instrument fix,
in terms of an amount of money or a portion of such income,
as a sum which is payable for the support of minor children
of such husband. In case such income is less than the amount
specified in the decree or instrument, for the purpose of ap-
plying the preceding sentence, such income, to the extent of
such sum payable for such support, shall be considered a pay-
ment for such support.
(b) Wife Considered a Beneficiary.-For the purposes of
computing the net income of the estate or trust and the net
86 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935).
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income of the wife described in section 22 (k) or subsection
(a) of this section, such wife shall be considered as the bene-
ficiary specified in this supplement. A periodic payment under
section 22 (k) to any part of which the provisions of this sup-
plement are applicable shall be included in the gross income
of the beneficiary in the taxable year in which under this
supplement such part is required to be included. 7
It should be noted that while section 171 deals exclusively with
trusts, section 22 (k) also deals with trusts and for this reason discussion
of the provisions of section 22 (k) dealing with the income "attributable
to property transferred" has been postponed to this point. Section
22 (k) refers in its first sentence to "periodic payments ... attributable
to property transferred (in trust or otherwise) in discharge of a legal
obligation which," etc. The last sentence of section 22 (k) is a cross-
reference to section 171 (b) "in cases where such periodic payments are
attributable to property of an estate or property held in trust." At first
glance the two provisions appear to overlap in trust cases, but actually
they do not. Section 22 (k) applies to cases in which the property is
transferred in discharge of a legal obligation imposed by the decree or
by an instrument incident to a divorce or legal separation. It would
not apply, for example, to a case in which the property had been trans-
ferred in a revocable trust not incident to a divorce, even though the
parties were later divorced. In such a case, the income would be taxable
to the husband if it were not for section 171.38 Furthermore, section
171 applies only to cases where the income would otherwise be taxable
to the husband, so that it does not apply to any case where the husband
already receives the benefits of section 22 (k). Of course it would hardly
matter which of the two sections applied (so long as one of them did)
if it were not for the fact that the two sections differ in some other
respects. First, section 22 (k) makes taxable to the wife all periodic
payments attributable to the property whether they are paid out of
income or out of principal. Thus if the husband creates a trust meeting
the requirements of section 22 (k) and providing that the trust shall
pay to the wife a~x annuity of $5000 payable out of corpus if the income
is insufficient, the wife is taxable on the $5000 she receives, even if the
income of the trust is only $3000 and the balance is paid out of
corpus.3 9 If the trust had failed to meet the requirements of section
22 (k) but had been governed by section 171, the wife would have been
37 The Revenue Act of 1943 added section 167 (c) which provides that income
of a trust which may be applied for the support of those the grantor is obligated
to support is not taxable to him unless actually so applied. This does not, of
course, affect the application of section 167 to most alimony trusts, so that even
if section 167 (c) had been in the law prior to 1942, it would still have been
necessary to enact section 171 as a companion to sections 22 (k) and 23 (n).
38 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.171-I.
39 U. S. Treas. Reg. 11, §§ 29.22 (k)-1 (b) and 29.171-2.
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taxable on only the $3000 paid out of income.40 There is probably an
additional difference between the two sections in the fact that the
installment provisions of section 22 (k) including the ten-year limita-
tion, would seem to be applicable to payments by a trust which
otherwise satisfies the requirements of section 22 (k); section 171, on the
other hand, does not contain these limitations.
It has been generally assumed in this discussion that the husband
is in a higher tax bracket than the wife and that for that reason it is
desirable to shift the tax to her. It should be noted, however, that in
the trust situation the same result does not always follow. Where the
payments to the wife to be made largely out of the corpus of
property transferred, and only partly out of income, shifting the bur-
den to the wife increases the aggregate tax burden of the couple, since
the wife is taxable on the corpus payments as well as the income pay-
ments, while the husband may exclude the income but apparently does
not acquire a right to deduct the corpus. The law is not entirely clear
on the latter point but section 23 (u) says that the husband is not
entitled to a deduction where "the amount of any such payment is,
under section 22 (k) or section 171, stated not to be includible in such
husband's gross income." Section 22 (k) "states" that payments attribu-
table to property transferred are not includible by the husband. The
fact that the corpus payments would not in any event be includible by
the husband appears irrelevant, since section 23 (u) does not say "the
amount which is, by virtue of section 22 (k) or section 171, not in-
cludible." Thus it is stated in the regulations that where the husband,
in order to meet an alimony obligation of $500 a month, purchases an
annuity contract paying her such amount, "the full $500 received by
the wife is includible in her income, and no part of such amount is
includible in the husband's income or deductible by him."41 The in-
clusion in the wife's income of that part of the payment which actually
represents income is matched by the exclusion of the same part from
the husband's income, but the inclusion in her income of the part of
the payment representing the return of the principal is not matched
by any corresponding tax benefit by the husband. The Treasury, anti-
cipating attempts to circumvent this provision, stated in the regulation
that if the husband transfers property to his wife so that she herself may
buy the annuity (hoping to avoid the tax on the part of the payment
representing corpus) the case will be treated as if the husband had
himself made the investment. 42 It might be possible to solve'this
problem by having the husband agree to make periodic payments to
the wife for life and to buy an annuity payable to himself to secure his
ability to make the payments. Here, even if it can successfully be con-
40 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.171-1.
41 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (k) -1.
42 ibid.
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tended that the payment is "attributable to" the property, (the an-
nuity) it seems impossible to hold that the property has been trans-
ferred. The husband should therefore be entitled to deduct the full
amount of the payments made.
ESTATE TAX
The Estate Tax is not in most cases of as great importance to the
parties as the income tax and the gift tax, since its imposition is de-
ferred and incidental. The few problems which have arisen have been
in connection with the treatment of insurance and of indebtedness for
alimony claims.
Section 812 (b) of the Code provides in part that there shall be
allowed as deductions the allowed claims against the estate with certain
limitations and exceptions, including the following:
The deduction herein allowed in the case of claims
against the estate.., shall, when founded upon a promise or
agreement, be limited to the extent that they were contracted
bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth ....
For the purposes of this subchapter, a relinquishment or
promised relinquishment of dower, curtesy, or of a statutory
estate created in lieu of dower or curtesy, or of other marital
rights in the decedent's property or estate, shall not be con-
sidered to any extent a consideration "in money or money's
worth."
In view of the language of the final sentence inserted in 1932, 43
it is now settled that a claim under a separation agreement is not a
deductible debt 44 where the consideration was the release of marital
rights in the property of the decedent. But a claim based on unpaid
alimony under a decree of divorce is deductible.4 5 It appeared, how-
ever, that the distinction rested not upon the difference between rights
in property and the right to support, but rather on the difference be-
tween claims founded on the decree and claims which, in the words of
section 812 (b) are "founded upon a promise or agreement."4 It was
the view of the court in these decisions that the release of support
rights was no more adequate consideration than the release of dower.
The Bureau, however, then took a position more favorable to the
43 Revenue Act of 1932, §804.
44 Sheets v. Commissioner, 95 F. 2d 727 (8th Cir. 1938).
45 Commissioner v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F. 2d 618 (1st. Cir. 1942).
46 Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F. 2nd. 929 (2d Cir. 1946), citing Meyer's Estate
v. Commissioner, 110 F. 2d 367 (2d Cir. 1940), Cert. denied, 310 U. S. 651 (1940);
Helvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F. 2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940); Adriance v.
Higgins, 113 F. 2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1940).
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taxpayer and issued E. T. 1947 a ruling dealing primarily with gift
tax48 but also announcing "the view of the Bureau that the surrender
of support rights is not one of the 'other marital rights' referred to in
the section [812 (b)]. The cases of Meyer's Estate v. Helvering (C. C. A.
2, 1940) (110 F. 2d 367, certiorari denied, 310 U. S. 651) and Helver-
ing v. United States Trust Co. et. al. (C.C.A. 2, 1940) (111 F. 2d 576)
will no longer be followed to the extent that they hold that the right of
a divorced wife to support from a former husband during the joint
lives of the parties is a marital right in his property or estate."
The question whether the claim is "founded on an agreement"
or on the decree of course remains to be decided. It has been held in
several cases that if the agreement is incorporated in the decree, at
least if the divorce court could have rejected the agreement had it
desired, the obligation is founded on the decree.49 Further definition
is probably required on this point. The recent gift tax decision by the
Supreme Court in Harris v. Commissioner,50 doaling with the same
issue, has not substantially clarified it.
With respect to life insurance, it might be expected that the de-
cisions would follow the pattern of the cases discussed above. Section
811 (g) requires inclusion in the estate of insurance payable to the
estate, or if payable to others, if the decedent either retained incidents
of ownership at his death, or if he paid premiums on it, "in propor-
tion that the amount so paid by the decedent bears to the total
premiums paid." No exception is made for insurance directed to dis-
charge obligations incurred in connection with a divorce. The Board
of Tax Appeals held in one case 5 ' that where insurance is used to
secure the payment of alimony, the insurance must be included, but a
deduction can be taken for the debt which it discharged. Where the
policy is used directly, as by an agreement to pay premiums on an
existing policy irrevocably payable to the wife, a different result may
be reached, however, since the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has held that such a policy is not to be considered payable to
the estate, and that the agreement effectively divests the insured of
the incidents of ownership. 52 This leaves the insurance taxable only
to the extent of the proportion of premiums paid by the insured, even
47 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166.
48 The litigation with respect to E. T. 19 in its gift tax aspects will be discussed
below.
49 Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F. 2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946); Fleming v. Yoke, 53
F. Supp. 552 (N. D. W. Va. 1944), aff'd, Yoke v. Fleming, 145 F. 2d 472 (4th Cir.
1944); Swink v. Commissioner, 4 T. C. M. 518 (1945), af'd, Commissioner v. Swink,
155 F. 2d 722 (4th Cir. 1946).
50 340 U. S. 106 (1950). This decision is discussed at greater length at pp.
40 - 44 infra.
51 Estate of Mason v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 813 (1941).
52 Cowles v. U. S., 152 F. 2d 212 (2d Cir. 1945).
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though the circumstances are such that the payment to the divorced
wife, if made with assets of the estate would not have been deductible.
If, therefore, the agreement provides for cash payments to the wife,
who in turn pays the premiums or not as she sees fit, it should be
possible to avoid estate tax on the insurance.
Girr TAX
The imposition of gift tax liability in connection with divorce
settlements is a comparatively recent development. It now seems clearly
established that in a prenuptial agreement, the release by the wife of
marital rights of support and dower is not "adequate and full con-
sideration" 58 and that a recital of consideration of such a nature does
not affect the status of a transfer as a gift.54 It was until recently sup-
posed that for gift tax purposes this rule was confined to prenuptial
cases and did not apply to divorce and separation settlements, and the
Tax Court so held in 1943, significance being attached to the fact that
the gift tax provisions do not, like section 812 (b) of the Estate Tax
Law, provide expressly that the release of marital rights shall not be
considered as a consideration in money or money's worth.55 In 1945
the Tax Court elected to follow its previous decision, four judges dis-
senting, in Converse v. Commissioner.58 The Treasury announced its
non-acquiescence, 57 and shortly thereafter issued a ruling,58 announc-
ing its position to be that a transfer in consideration for the wife's
release of "support" rights in connection with a divorce or separation
settlement did not constitute a gift but that the release of "property or
inheritance rights" is not consideration for the transfer, which is there-
fore a gift; and further, that to the extent that the value of the pay-
ment made exceeded the value of the support rights (actuarial
53 § 1002.
54 U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, §86.8; U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 8 (1936). This
position was sustained by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324
U. S. 303 (1945) ; and Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U. S. 308 (1945).
55 Jones v. Commissioner, 1 T. C. 1207 (1943); Geary v. Commissioner,
2 T. C. M. 202 (1943). The Treasury announced its non-acquiescence in the Jones
decision (1943 Cum. Bull. 34) but dismissed its petition for review. The court had
previously, however, in the same year, held that a payment, pursuant to a separa-
tion agreement, in consideration for the release of obligations under a prenuptial
contract was a gift. Lasker v. Commissioner, 1 T. C. 208 (1942), retfd, 138 F.
2d 989 (7th Cir. 1943). Yet as recently as 1942 the Treasury had successfully con-
tended that a transfer of property pursuant to a divorce decree resulted in the
realization of capital gain by the husband. Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F. 2d
642 (2d Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F. 2d 986 (1941). These cases may
still be applicable in situations where the gift tax does not apply.
58 5 T. C. 1014 (1945); accord, Mitchell v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 159 (1946).
57 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 5.
58 E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166.
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standards being taken into account) the transfer was taxable.
In the meantime, the Tax Court reached the same result in
Lahti v. Commissioner,5 9 and the following year the Converse case was
affirmed on appeal.60 The court discussed E. T. 19 in Judson v. Com-
missioner,61 but found it unnecessary to determine whether it cor-
rectly stated the law, holding that since the Commissioner had not
shown the allocation of the payment between the support rights and
the maintenance rights, and since the release of support rights pro-
vided adequate consideration, no gift tax was payable. In the same year,
in Thompson v. Commissioner,62 the court held that a transfer by the
wife to the husband in a separation agreement incorporated in a
divorce decree, in consideration of the release of inheritance rights only,
was a gift. The court indicated in this discussion that its decision
rested on the fact that there was no obligation of support which the
divorce court could have forced upon the transferor. The same
principle was applied in Estate of Barnard v. Commissioner,6 3 where
two payments were made, one of which was incorporated in the decree,
the court holding that there was consideration for this payment but
not for the other since the consideration had already been received.
The decision was later reversed, however, the Court of Appeals holding
both payments taxable. 64
In 1948, six more cases involving E. T. 19 reached the Tax Court.
Hooker v. Comniissioner65 involved transfers to a trust for the chil-
dren, the court holding that the value of the assets transferred in excess
of the value of the income provided for the children during their mi-
norities (when the taxpayer had a legal obligation to support them)
was a gift. While the court declined to apply a part of the holding of the
Converse case which applied to payments for the support of minor
children, it stated that payments to children fell into the same class as
prenuptial transfers to the wife and the circumstances in such cases
could not, as in the case of payments to the wife incident to divorce, be
presumed to "negative the presence of a donative intent." The Court
of Appeals affirmed.6 6 The Tax Court continued, however, in four
more cases, to maintain its position that where the transfer was ordered
by the divorce court it was not a gift.67 Two of these cases, McLean v.
59 6 T. C. 7 (1946).
60 163 F. 2d 131 (2d Cir. 1947).
61 6 T. C. M. 242 (1947).
62 6 T. C. M. 822 (1947).
63 9 T. C. 61 (1947).
64 Commissioner v. Estate of Barnard, 176 F. 2d 233 (2d Cir. 1949).
65 10 T. C. 388 (1948).
66 174 F. 2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949).
67 Estate of Moore v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. 393 (1948) (non-acq.); Harris
v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. 741 (1948); McLean v. Commissioner, 11 T. C. 543
(1948) (non-acq.); Taurog v. Commissioner, 11 T. C. 1016 (1948) (involving a
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Commissioner and Harris v. Commissioner, are of particular interest.
In the McLean case, the taxpayer agreed to make periodic payments
to his former wife until she remarried, and after her remarriage, to
make further periodic payments until 1955. The wife released both
support rights and property claims. The Commissioner contended that
the computed value of the payments agreed to be made after re-
marriage, when the right to support would no longer exist, was a gift
under E. T. 19. The court held first that whether some payments
might be made before or after marriage was irrelevant, the question
being whether there was consideration for whatever payment was
made; and second that the release of the wife's claims constituted full
and adequate consideration in money or money's worth, the situation
differing from the prenuptial cases in that the wife in the divorce
situation has an existing and enforceable claim to release, adding:
For reasons not clear to us, E. T. 19 excepts support
and maintenance from marital rights the release of which
does not constitute full and adequate consideration. We deem
the ruling invalid in so far as it does not also except transfers
made to settle presently enforceable claims.68
In the Harris case, the husband and wife had made a settlement
involving reciprocal transfers of property, gift tax being asserted
against the excess received by the husband. The agreement was con-
ditioned on the granting of a divorce, but was to survive the decree.
The Tax Court ruled for the taxpayer on the ground that the payment
was founded on the decree.
The Treasury filed petitions for review in both the McLean and
Harris cases, but prosecuted only that in the Harris case, which of
course did not involve support payments. The Court of Appeals held 69
that the distinction between payments founded on an agreement and
payments founded on a decree, previously applied to the estate tax
problem in the Maresi case,70 was applicable to the gift tax as well,
but reversed the Tax Court on the ground that since the agreement,
which had been approved by the divorce court, provided that it should
survive the decree, the transfer was founded as much on the agreement
as on the decree, and was subject to tax. It distinguished the Converse
case 7 ' on the same ground.
division of community property); Harding v. Commissioner, 11 T. C. 1051 (1948)
(involving a lump sum plus periodic payments, all of which were in consideration
of the release of all support and property rights. Although the agreement was to
be binding regardless of divorce, a divorce was later obtained. The Bureau an-
nounced its acquiescence in this decision).
68 11 T. C. at 549.
69 178 F. 2d 861.
70 Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F. 2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946).
71 5 T. C. 1014 (1945).
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The following year the Supreme Court reversed this decision of
the Court of Appeals holding that the payment was "founded on the
decree" because it was enforced by it, and expressly approved the
Maresi and Converse cases, which it said were not distinguishable. 2
It is not easy, however, to distill from the decision a reliable test of
whether any given payment is in fact "based on the decree." The
majority opinion directs attention to the fact that the settlement was
to become effective only in the event a divorce should be decreed and
noted further that the agreement provided that it was to be submitted
to the divorce court "for its approval." After these observations, Mr.
Justice Douglas states:
If the agreement had stopped there and were in fact
submitted to the court, it is clear that the gift tax would not
be applicable. That arrangement would not be a "promise or
agreement" in the statutory sense. It would be wholly con-
ditional upon the entry of the decree; the divorce court might
or might not accept the provisions of the arrangement as the
measure of the respective obligations; it might indeed add to
or subtract from them. The decree, not the arrangement sub-
mitted to the court, would fix the rights and obligations of
the parties. That was the theory of Commissioner v. Maresi,
156 F. 2d 929 [46-1 USTO Para. 10,276], and we think it
sound.
Later in the opinion it is stated:
Yet without the decree there would be no enforceable,
existing agreement whether the settlement was litigated or
unlitigated. Both required the approval of the court before an
obligation arises. The happenstance that the divorce court
might approve the entire settlement, or modify it in un-
substantial details, or work out material changes seems to us
unimportant. In each case it is the decree that creates the
rights and the duties; and a decree is not a "promise or
agreement" in any sense-popular or statutory.
The court next goes on to consider the argument advanced by the
government based on the provision of the agreement that its terms
were to survive the decree of divorce. The court disregards this cir-
cumstance largely on the ground that the court is concerned with the
source of the rights and not with the manner in which the rights at
some distant time may be enforced. At the conclusion of the opinion,
it is stated that the Treasury regulations considering gifts where "a
promise or agreement" is involved are not intended to apply to
situations of this kind.
There has been only one decision of the Tax Court since the
Harris case involving this problem. In McMurtry v. Commissioner73
72 340 U. S. 106 (1950).
78 16 T. C. 168 (1951).
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it appeared that the decree had "approved" the divorce, but that the
agreement was neither contingent upon nor enforced by the decree.
The agreement provided for the creation of trusts to make periodic
payments to the wife until her death or remarriage, a child receiving
the balance of the income prior to the wife's remarriage, and all the
income thereafter, during the child's life. The court distinguished the
Harris case on its facts, pointing out that the agreement created en-
forceable rights without any further action by the court, and held the
transfers taxable. At the same time, it held that only that part of the
amounts transferred was subject to tax as exceeded the actuarial value
of the support rights, thus reversing its position in the McLean case 74
on the authority of the Court of Appeals' decision in the Barnard
case.75
If the state of the law at this point may seem to the practicing
lawyer to be confused, it is probably because that is the fact. The cases
have been discussed above chronologically for the very reason that the
application of the gift tax in this situation is a recent development
which has not yet reached a stage where any very certain principles
have evolved. A few guideposts, however, can be pointed out. First,
the infrequency of Supreme Court decisions on any single point of
law usually means that a large body of lower court decisions will be
built upon the holdings, dicta and necessary and unnecessary im-
plications of any Supreme Court pronouncement, and the Harris case
will be no exception. Second, it now appears that the doctrine of the
older Tax Court decisions that a settlement incident to divorce is
essentially different (from the point of view of the existence of "con-
sideration") from a prenuptial agreement is now obsolete; the issue
now depends upon whether the obligation is founded on the decree or
on the agreement. The key to the determination of this question,
however, is somewhat harder to discover. In the Harris case, the agree-
ment (a) was conditioned on the divorce and (b) was enforced by the
decree, but (c) survived entry of the decree.
It is to be noted that Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized the fact that
the settlement provisions were subject to approval of the court and
might be modified by the court. A doubtful case might be one in which
a settlement agreement was made which was to become effective only
upon the entry of a decree of divorce and where the decree of divorce
made no reference to the settlement agreement. Such a situation might
be distinguishable even though the court had the power to upset the
settlement agreement or make different provisions than provided in
the agreement, since it might be argued that the decree was not the
source of the obligation in a case where the decree did not order com-
pliance with the agreement. As a practical matter, in such a situation
74 11 T. C. 543 (1948) (non-acq.).
75 176 F. 2d 233 (2d Cir. 1949).
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there would be nothing in the divorce decree to indicate what the
obligation was.
Bearing in mind that in the Harris case the divorce court ap-
parently incorporated some of the provisions of the settlement agree-
ment in its decree, (although this factor was not emphasized) a
question arises as to whether it would be safe to have the court
specifically approve the agreement and order the parties to comply with
it. This may be a reasonably safe course if the majority opinion is
to be followed, although some doubt may be cast upon this in the
dissent of Justice Frankfurter. It was noted in the dissenting opinion
that one of the transfers required by the agreement was not in-
corporated in the divorce decree and the Justice stated in the footnote
".... and therefore is enforceable presumably only under the contract."
This point of view Justice Frankfurter describes as the narrower
ground but states in the footnote that "on the broader ground ap-
parently employed [in the majority opinion] no gift tax is due." Thus
the dissenting opinion might be said to cast some doubt on just what
the majority opinion held in this respect.
Third, if it is established that the inter-relation of the agreement
and the decree is such as to give rise to potential gift tax liability, the
McMurtry case indicates that payments for support remain free of tax
and it is only the payments in consideration of the release of property
rights that are taxable; further, that the two may be separated by the
application of actuarial standards. In these respects the Bureau has
finally, after five years of litigation, persuaded the courts to adopt
E. T. 19.
Finally, it is apparently still true, as in the HookerT8 case, that
the transfers for children's benefit are treated in the same manner as
those for the wife, since the income for the child in the McMurtry case
was held to be non-taxable to the extent that it provided for her sup-
port during minority. It seems possible, however, that this point may
be subject to future attack by the Bureau.
RECO.MENDATIONS
The principal task of the lawyer who gives tax advice in con-
nection with a matter of this kind is not to decide what tax may be pay-
able on a given set of facts, but rather to devise an arrangement which,
while accomplishing the general purposes of the parties, will be least
likely to produce unforeseen and unfavorable tax results. If it appears
that all that is needed by the parties is simple alimony for the period
until the wife dies or remarries, the amounts to be paid can be
76 10 T. C. 388 (1948).
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established on the assumption that the wife will pay the income tax
and that no gift tax will be payable.
But what of the more complicated settlement? It may be taken as
reasonably dear that to the extent that the obligation is created in the
decree alone, there being no agreement, there will be no gift tax
liability under the Harris case; but since the possibilities for variety are
limited if the matter is left to the decree alone, any more complicated
plan will have to be based, at least initially, on an agreement. In order
to avoid gift tax liability, it would of course be desirable to have the
agreement conditioned upon the decree; if it is also provided that the
agreement is to be approved by the court, the necessary disclosure
would seem to dispose of any possibility of a later contention that the
form of the agreement made the divorce collusive. If, as is sometimes
the case where there may be some delay before the divorce is granted,
or where the parties want to avoid having one of them attempt to
defeat the settlement in the divorce court, it is desired to have the
agreement binding in any event, it would nevertheless be advisable to
provide that the court should approve the agreement, incorporate it
in the decree, and order compliance with it. In order to avoid any
question concerning the validity of the incorporation it is probably
also the better practice to have the decree incorporate the operative
provisions of the agreement in terms, rather than by reference to the
agreement. Obviously, in any case where the Harris case is to be relied
on, the transfer in question should not be made until after the decree.
So long as the Harris case continues to stand for what it appears
to say, this should solve the gift tax problem. Bearing in mind, how-
ever, that the Treasury in E. T. 19 proposed a set of principles which
were not dependent on whether the obligation was created by the de-
cree or by the instrument, it is advisable, particularly if large amounts
are involved, to assume that future inroads may be made on the pro-
tection afforded by the Harris case. 77 This suggests that periodic pay-
ments to be continued after remarriage should be avoided wherever
possible. If a separate consideration were given for the release of the
property rights, and if it were expressly stipulated that periodic
payments to the wife for life were to be made in consideration only of
her release of her right to support prior to remarriage, it is at least
possible that the allocation would be sustained. The McMurtry case,
while it overrules the refusal of the McLean case to recognize a dif-
ference between support rights and property rights, does not necessarily
require that the determination of the allocation of the payments by
the husband between support rights and property rights correspond to
the relative values of the payments to be made before remarriage and
77 It has already been attacked by commentators with considerable persuasi-
veness. Taylor and Swartz, Tax Aspects of Marital Property Agreements, 7 TAx L.
REV. 19 (1951).
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the payments to be made afterward, since it adopted that standard
only for lack of any other in the evidence.
It should be noted that in cases where all payments are to be in
the form of principal sums, whether or not payable in installments,
allocation might similarly be made by providing for a separate pay-
ment for the release of each of the two rights. The allocation would
have to be reasonable, but if it were it might help to forestall possible
litigation. Furthermore, if such an allocation is made, the support
payments might be made binding in any event and the praperty
settlement conditioned on the divorce.
It has been pointed out above that it is unwise to use a trust to
make payments where corpus will be used for the purpose, since such
payments will be subject to income tax on the wife without a cor-
responding deduction for the husband. In general, it appears that it
is better to use the trust as a security device rather than for direct
payments, since the foregoing objection is removed and the gift tax
problem alleviated. On the other hand, a trust may be a desirable
method where corpus is not to be used to make periodic payments and
where the gift tax is not a serious objection. Consideration may also
be given to the use of a trust qualifying under section 171 rather than
22 (k), although such a trust cannot, of course, have the protection of
the Harris case against gift tax, not being "founded on the decree."
Without respect to provisions for children, it should be remem-
bered that it is not the intention of the Code to make it easier for a
father to transfer his estate to his children merely because he is
divorced from their mother. His relationship to them continues as
before, and like other fathers he may not, in general, deduct the cost
of their upbringing, nor transfer large amounts of capital to them free
of gift tax. He is, however, permitted to agree to pay the mother a
gross amount for her own support and that of the children and thus
shift the tax burden (along with the dependency credits) to the
presumably less heavily taxed income of the mother, and if circum-
stances are such as to make such an arrangement otherwise satisfactory,
this is of course a preferable method. It should be noted, however, that
if the payments for both purposes are combined in this way, it is not
possible to use a provision terminating the payments on remarriage,
and a gift tax problem is thus created (depending perhaps, on the
vitality of the Harris case) if a direct-paying trust is used.
Insurance creates a special problem. Since policies transferred
(other than to the insured) for a valuable consideration lose their in-
come tax exemption with respect to payment at maturity,"" it is
probably unwise to transfer policies to the wife until the extent to
which divorce is a valuable consideration has been further clarified,
even if the gift tax is not a serious obstacle. To have ownership retained
78 Sec. 22 (b) (2).
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by the husband, he agreeing to pay the premiums (perhaps with a
trust as guarantor) and to make her the sole beneficiary, is probably
satisfactory for income and gift tax purposes, but will probably raise
estate tax difficulties. The best arrangement is of course to have the
wife take out a new policy on the husband's life and pay the premiums
herself out of the income he pays her. If this is impossible, the best
solution is probably not to transfer the policies but to divest the
husband of the "incidents of ownership" by forbidding him to exercise
any of them, the wife again paying the premiums.
A final word should be said about tax indemnity provisions.
Such provisions have not yet been at issue in the litigated cases, 79 but
it is understood that a number are in effect. It is usually provided by
such a provision (assuming that the amount of a series of payments
was negotiated on the basis that they would be taxable to the wife)
that if any part of the payment should be taxed to the husband (or
held not deductible by him) the wife will indemnify him in accordance
with a specified formula which also reduces the later payments. Since
the parties may be in quite different tax brackets, some problems arise
as to the measure of the reduction, and the wife should probably not
be required to compensate him to the extent of the entire increase in
his tax. A fair arrangement is probably to provide that the husband
shall be reimbursed to the extent that the shift of the tax burden back
to him reduces the wife's net tax liability below what it would other-
wise have been, (but not in excess of the increase in his burden) and
which thereafter provides a corresponding reduction in periodic pay-
ments. Of course such indemnities must be reciprocal if the agreement
includes some payments which are thought to be taxable to the wife
and some which are not.
An indemnity clause with respect to the gift tax is of course not
practical, since we are dealing there not with a tax unexpectedly
shifted to the other party but with a tax the parties did not expect at
all, and the disadvantage of one party cannot be set off against the
windfall to the other. The same is true of the estate tax.
Income tax indemnity clauses such as the above involve complica-
tions in drafting which cannot be covered in a brief review, and the
unraveling of them, if they ever become operative, will probably be
even more complicated. Nevertheless their use will probably continue
by those who draft settlements with any awareness of the fact that
they are dealing with shifting authorities in an unsettled aspect of a
complicated and uncertain subject.
79 A provision in the divorce decree that the wife should pay the taxes was
held without significance in determining tax liability in Casey v. Commissioner,
12 T. C. 224. And the settlement considered in the McLean case (p. 3, supra)
contained a provision reducing the periodic payments to a specified lower figure if
they were held not deductible by the husband.
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